Abstract. We analyze the multiparty contract-signing protocols of Garay and MacKenzie (GM) and of Baum and Waidner (BW). We use a finite-state tool, MOCHA, which allows specification of protocol properties in a branching-time temporal logic with game semantics. While our analysis does not reveal any errors in the BW protocol, in the GM protocol we discover serious problems with fairness for four signers and an oversight regarding abuse-freeness for three signers. We propose a complete revision of the GM subprotocols in order to restore fairness.
Introduction
The problem of digitally signing a contract over a network is more complicated than signing a contract by Bpen and paper.^The problem arises because of an inherent asymmetry: no signer wants to be the first one to sign the contract because another signer could refuse to do so after having obtained the first signer's contract.
A simple solution consists in using a trusted party (T) as an intermediary. Signers send their respective contracts to T, which first collects the contracts and then distributes them among the signers. An intermediary is known to be necessary (Even and Yacobi, 1980) . However, because of the communication and computation bottleneck at T, this solution is inefficient. Other solutions include randomized protocols and protocols based on gradual information exchange. More recently, the so-called optimistic approach was introduced in (Asokan et al., 1997) and (Burk and Pfitzmann, 1990) . The idea is that T intervenes only when a problem arises, for example, a signer is trying to cheat or a network failure occurs at a crucial moment during the protocol. Such protocols generally consist of a main protocol and one or several subprotocols, each with a fixed number of messages. The main protocol is executed by the signers in order to exchange their signatures. The subprotocols are used to contact T in order to force a successful outcome or to abort the protocol.
A contract-signing protocol should respect several desirable properties. The first property is fairness. Intuitively, a contract-signing protocol is fair if at the end of the protocol either each signer obtains all the other signers' contracts or no signer gets any valuable information. A second property, timeliness, ensures that signer has some recourse to prevent endless waiting. Both fairness and timeliness are standard properties that are also important in fair exchange, certified e-mail, and fair nonrepudiation protocols. A property that is specific to contract signing, abuse-freeness, was introduced in . A protocol is abuse-free if no signer A is able to prove to an external observer that A has the power to choose between successfully concluding the protocol and aborting the protocol. A protocol that is not abuse-free gives an undesirable advantage to one signer, say Alice, who has the power to decide the outcome of the protocol and can prove this to an external observer. If, for instance, Alice wants to sell a house to Charlie, she could initiate a contract with Bob just to force Charlie to increase his offer.
There have been several applications of formal methods to contract signing, so far only for the special case of two signers. The finite model checker Mur' is used in (Shmatikov and Mitchell, 2002) to analyze two contract-signing protocols, discover subtle errors, and suggest corrections. In (Chadha et al., 2001) inductive methods are used to reason about contract-signing protocols specified in the multiset-rewriting framework (MSR). Protocol properties are expressed in terms of strategies, which provide a natural framework for the analysis. In (Kremer and Raskin, 2002 ) the finite model checker MOCHA is used to analyze two contract-signing protocols. The advantage of using MOCHA rather than Mur' is that MOCHA allows to specify protocol properties in ATL, a temporal logic with game semantics, which in turn allows reasoning about strategies. In (Gürgens and Rudolph, 2003 ) the finite state tool SHVT is used to analyze several variants of the ZhouYGollmann nonrepudiation protocols (nonrepudiation protocols are closely related to contract signing protocols). Protocols are modeled by using asynchronous product automata, and properties are basically invariants. They show unknown attacks that can occur in a realistic implementation of the protocol. The most recent work on contract signing (Chadha et al., 2005) introduces the notion of an optimistic signer, that is, a signer that prefers to wait for Bsome time^for messages from the other signers before contacting the trusted party. The main theorem of (Chadha et al., 2005) is that, independently of a specific protocol, if any of the signers is optimistic, then the other signer will at some point of the protocol have the power to decide the outcome.
All the efforts just described consider only two-party protocols. In this paper we analyze multiparty contract-signing protocols (Baum-Waidner and Waidner, 2000; . The protocol goal in that case is that each signer sends its signature on a previously agreed upon contract text to all other signers and that each signer receives all other signers' signatures on this contract. In a multiparty framework, fairness, timeliness, and abuse-freeness should hold against any coalition of dishonest parties. Unlike in the two-party case, the complexity level of the multiparty protocols, especially , is such that a tool, for example, a model checker, is indispensable in the analysis. This partly comes about from an important difference between the twoparty and the multiparty case, namely, in the multiparty case T has to be able to overturn its previous abort decisions ). As our analysis shows, this feature is particularly difficult to design correctly.
We chose MOCHA for our analysis which allowed specification of properties in ATL, a branching-time temporal logic with game semantics. Apart from our familiarity with MOCHA, two important aspects of optimistic contract signing influenced our choice of the tool. The first is the branching aspect of optimistic contract-signing protocols; the protocols usually consist of subprotocols that can be invoked at specific moments. The other is that the desired properties of contract signing are naturally expressed as winning strategies in games.
For example, one possible formulation of fairness often used in literature (Kremer and Raskin, 2002; Chadha et al., 2005) , is that a protocol is fair for an honest signer Alice if whenever some other signer, say Bob, receives Alice's signature on the contract, then Alice has a strategy to get the signed contracts from all other signers. Similarly, a possible formulation for timeliness (Kremer and Raskin, 2002) says that a protocol is timely for Alice if, regardless of the state of execution of the protocol, Alice has a strategy to reach a terminal state in which she neither is required to send any messages nor expects any messages.
It is in the formulation of abuse-freeness, however, that strategies seem to be indispensable. In (Chadha et al., 2003) , for example, a protocol is said to be abuse-free for Alice if it does not provide a provable advantage to the remaining signers. Assuming that Alice always prefers to wait for Bsome time^before contacting the trusted party, a protocol is said to provide provable advantage to a coalition of signers against Alice at a point in a protocols if (a) they have a strategy to abort the exchange, (b) they have a strategy to complete the exchange, and (c) they can prove to an outside observer that Alice is participating in the protocol. Our formulation of abuse-freeness follows this definition.
Although, ATL does allow elegant formulation of the desired properties in terms of strategies, the failure of an ATL formula cannot be explained by an error-trace in general. Hence the model checker MOCHA does not provide error traces when these properties fail. Therefore, we looked at other possible formu-lations of the security properties. For example, we could formulate fairness as a state invariant: a protocol is fair for Alice if in all states terminal for Alice, either Alice has the signed contract or none of the other signers have Alice's signature on the contract. The advantage of this formulation is that MOCHA does provide error traces for invariant checking.
The formulation of fairness as an invariant is strictly weaker than formulation of fairness in terms of strategies mentioned before, and it is relatively easy to construct examples in which fairness in terms of strategies is violated even if the invariant holds. However, in the presence of timeliness stated in terms of strategies, these are essentially equivalent. The importance of this result to our work is that since our protocol models satisfied timeliness in terms of strategies, verifying the weaker formulation of fairness in terms of fairness was equivalent to verifying the stronger formulation of fairness in terms of strategies. In their work, Shmatikov and Mitchell (2002) use a similar invariant specification of fairness, without however showing the exact relations with other versions of fairness when timeliness is respected.
Our analysis revealed an essential obstacle in the GM protocol ), which appears not to be removable without completely changing the subprotocols for T and which leads to the failure of fairness in the case of four signers. In particular, assuming that three signers were dishonest, we found traces leading to a state in which some dishonest signer has the signature of the honest signer, while the honest signer has terminated without having received any signed contracts.
Our analysis also showed that the GM protocol is vulnerable if only two of the signers are dishonest. The dishonest signers may bring the protocol to a state in which an honest signer has terminated without having received any signed contracts, while the other honest signer has received all the signed contracts. Even though the protocol does not provide an advantage to the dishonest signers in this case, this protocol execution must be viewed as being unfair for the first signer. We did not discover any problems when there was only one dishonest signer.
We present the fairness attacks on the GM protocol in detail in the paper and propose a corrected version of the GM protocol, which has been validated by MOCHA. MOCHA did not find any problems with fairness in the BW protocol (Baum-Waidner and Waidner, 2000) nor in the original GM protocol with only three signers. In the latter case, MOCHA did find an amusing problem with abusefreeness, but this problem is easily corrected. We believe that the main reason for robustness of the BW protocol is that overturning the abort decisions has been designed correctly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the BW and the GM protocols. In Section 3, we present briefly the finite-state tool, MOCHA, the temporal logic ATL and its game semantics. Modeling of the protocols and protocol assumptions in the game semantics along with the model-ing of fairness and timeliness in ATL is discussed. We also show in this section how the invariant formulation of fairness is related to other formulations of fairness. In Section 4, we report on our analysis of the BW and GM protocols using MOCHA, present the fairness attacks on four signers in detail, and propose a corrected version of the protocol. We discuss briefly how to restore fairness and present the anomaly with respect to abuse-freeness for three signers. In order to detect this anomaly, we had to model optimistic signers; we discuss this issue. In Section 5 we summarize our results and discuss directions for future work.
Protocol Description
In this section we describe the multiparty contract-signing protocols proposed by (Baum-Waidner and Waidner, 2000) and . Unlike two-party protocols, which generally have similar structures, the two multiparty protocols that we describe below have fundamentally different structures. For this section and for the rest of the paper, we shall assume that each protocol participant has a private signing key and a corresponding public verification key. Each participant shall be identified with this private/public key pair, and if we say that BA can . . . ,^we shall mean anyone that possesses the private key of A.
GM MULTIPARTY CONTRACT-SIGNING PROTOCOL
The protocol allows n (n ! 2) participants, say P 1 ; . . . ; P n , to exchange signatures with the help of a trusted party T on a preagreed contract text m: P i is said to have a contract if it has everybody's signature on the text m. The order of the participants P 1 ; . . . ; P n ; henceforth referred to as signers, and the identity of T are also agreed upon before the protocol begins. The preagreed contract text m contains an identifier that uniquely identifies each protocol instance. In , the communication among the participants is assumed to be over a network channel in control of a BDolevYYao intruder,^while the communication between the participants and the trusted party is assumed to be over a private channel.
The protocol uses zero-knowledge cryptographic primitives, private contract signatures, that were first introduced in . The private contract signature of A for B on text m with respect to a trusted party T, denoted as PCS A ðm; B; TÞ has the following properties:
(a) PCS A ðm; B; TÞ can be created by A. (b) PCS A ðm; B; TÞ can be faked by B. Only A, B, and T can tell the difference between PCS and its simulation. (c) PCS A ðm; B; TÞ can be converted into a conventional universally verifiable digital signature, S A ðmÞ, by both A and T. Only A and T can do this conversion.
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The protocol itself consists of three subprotocols: main, abort, and recovery subprotocols. Usually signers try to achieve the exchange by executing the main subprotocol. They contact T using one of the other two subprotocols when they think something is amiss. Once a signer contacts T, it no longer takes part in the main subprotocol. T responds to a request with either an abort token or a signed contract. The decision whether to reply with an abort token or with a signed contract is based on a database maintained by T, which stores all the relevant information of the requests and its responses. Once T sends back a signed contract, it always replies with the signed contract. As discussed below, a decision to abort may, however, be overturned in order to maintain fairness. We discuss the subprotocols in some detail.
Main protocol. The main protocol for n signers is divided into n-levels that can be described recursively. For each level of recursion, a different Bstrength^of promise is used. The strength of a promise is denoted by an integer Blevel,^and an Bi-level promise from signer A to signer B on a message m^is implemented by using PCS: PCS A ððm; iÞ;B; TÞ.
In level i; signers P i through P 1 exchange i-level promises to sign the contract. The i-level protocol is triggered when P i receives 1-level promises from P iþ1 ; . . . ; P n : After receiving these promises, P i sends out its 1-level promise to signers P iÀ1 ; . . . ; P 1 and waits for i À 1 level to finish. At the end of the i À 1 level, P 1 ; . . . ; P iÀ1 have exchanged i À 1 level promises and P i receives a i À 1 level promise from each of the signers P 1 ; . . . ; P iÀ1 : Now P i ; . . . ; P 1 exchange i level promises, and close the higher levels.
In order to close level a; where a > i; P i sends an ða À 1Þ-level promise to P a and waits for a-level promises from signers P iþ1 ; . . . ; P a : After receiving these promises, P i indicates its willingness to close the level a to signers P 1 ; . . . ; P iÀ1 by sending them its a-level promise, and in return waits for a-level promises from them. Upon receiving these, P i sends its a-level promises to P iþ1 ; . . . ; P a , completing its obligation in the a-level protocol. P i then proceeds to complete a þ 1 level.
Once the n -levels are completed, each signer has a n -level promise from everybody else, and the contract exchange is ready to begin. In this exchange, each signer also sends a n þ 1-level promise to everybody along with its signature on the preagreed text. In order to complete the exchange, signer P i waits for the contract and n þ 1-level promises from P n ; . . . ; P iþ1 : Upon receiving these, P i sends its signature and n þ 1-level promises to everybody, and waits for the signatures and n þ 1-level promises from P iÀ1 ; . . . ; P 1 . Once these are received, the protocol ends for P i , and P i has the contract.
If some expected messages are not received, P i may either quit the protocol or contact T. P i may simply quit the protocol if it has not sent any promises or contact T if it has sent some promises. It may contact T with a request to abort if it has not received any promise from some signer. It may request T to recover the protocol if it has a promise from every other signer. A detailed description of the main protocol is given in Table I .
In order to illustrate the main protocol, consider an instance of the protocol with three signers: Alice, Bob, and Carol playing the roles of P 3 , P 2 , and P 1 , respectively. For lack of space, we just illustrate the role of Alice. Alice starts the protocol by sending level 1 promises to Bob and Carol, and waits for level 2 promises from Bob and Carol. If Alice does not receive them, then Alice may contact T with a request to abort the exchange. If Alice does receive the promises, then she sends her level 3 promises to Bob and Carol, and waits for their level 3 promises in return. If Alice does not receive these promises, then she contact T with a recovery request. Otherwise, she sends her signature on the preagreed text along with level 4 promises to Bob and Carol and waits for their signatures. The protocol finishes for her when she receives the contract. Otherwise, she may launch the recovery subprotocol and contact T.
Abort protocol. T maintains two sets, SðmÞ and FðmÞ, that are used by T to make decisions when a signer contacts T. These sets are created when T is contacted for the first time for m and are initialized to be empty. The set SðmÞ contains the indices of all signers that have contacted T and received an abort token from T in response. The intuitive meaning of the set FðmÞ is not clearly stated in , but it contains some additional information that T uses in deciding when to overturn an abort decision that T has taken before.
The details of the abort protocol are given in Table II . Mainly, if T is contacted with a request to abort, then T checks its database. If this is the first request or if the protocol has not already been recovered, T sends back an abort token and updates the sets SðmÞ and FðmÞ. If the protocol has already been successfully recovered, T sends back a signed contract.
Recovery protocol. The details of the recovery protocol are given in Table III . For P i to recover, it sends the message S P i fPCS P j ððm; k j Þ; P i ; Tg j2f1;...;ngnfig ; S P i ððm; 1ÞÞÞ where Y if j > i, k j is the maximum level of a promise received from P j on m, Y if j < i, k j is the maximum level of promises received from all signers P j 0 , with j 0 < i, i.e., the minYmax of the level of promises from signers with lower index. (For example, if the maximum level of the promises received by P 4 from P 3 and P 2 was 6, and the maximum level received by P 4 from P 1 was 5, then it would send the five-level promises for P 1 , P 2 and P 3 .) FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING t1.1 Table I . GM multiparty contract-signing protocol Y Main for P i .
If T is contacted with a request to recover, then T checks its database. If this is the first request for m or if the protocol has already been recovered, T replies with a signed contract, which it obtains by converting the promises into conventional digital signatures. Otherwise, if the protocol has already been aborted, T must decide whether to maintain the abort or to overturn it. Overturning of the abort is necessary in order to maintain fairness. Indeed, consider the scenario in which a dishonest P nÀ1 contacts T with an abort request, receives an abort token and dishonestly continues the protocol. After the n levels are completed, P n sends its signature to others and waits for signatures from other signers. If P nÀ1 does not send back its signature, then P n will be forced to contact T with a request to recover. Now, T must overturn its previous abort, otherwise P n will not receive the signature of P nÀ1 . The decision whether to overturn is based on the contents of the sets SðmÞ and FðmÞ, as described in Table III. 
BW MULTIPARTY CONTRACT-SIGNING PROTOCOL
The protocol allows n (n ! 2) participants or signers, say P 1 ; . . . ; P n , to exchange signatures with the help of a trusted party T on a preagreed contract text m. In our description, we suppose n À 1 potentially dishonest signers. The original protocol is actually parameterized with respect to a threshold t, the maximum number of possibly dishonest signers. In our analysis, however, we assume the worst possible scenario for an honest signer, namely, that all the other signers are dishonest (i.e., t is n À 1). We assume the same hypotheses on the network as for the GM protocol. The protocol consists of two subprotocols: main and recovery. Usually signers try to achieve the exchange by executing the main subprotocol. They contact T using the recovery subprotocol when they think something is amiss.
t2.1
Main protocol. The main protocol for each signer P i is given in Table IV . The protocol is symmetric for each signer and is composed of n þ 1 rounds.
j In each round, each signer sends a promise to other signers. The level of the promise is increased in each round and considered as a signed contract once the round number equals n þ 1. The promise is implemented by using a universally verifiable digital signature that includes the history of all previously received promises, through the vectors M and X, as defined in Table IV . If any expected message is not received, P i can decide to launch a recovery protocol.
Recovery Protocol. The details of the recovery protocol are given in Table V . If the recovery request is launched in the first round, that is, P i did not receive a message from all the signers, the recovery request consists of the first level promise of P i . Otherwise, if r > 1, the recovery request contains, via the vector X rÀ1;i (see the main subprotocol in Table IV), the set of received messages until round r À 1, including the r À 1 promises from all the other signers. Table IV . BW multiparty contract-signing protocol Y Main for P i .
t4.1
j In Baum-Waidner and Waidner (2000), the protocol has t þ 2 rounds. Table V . BW multiparty contract signing protocol Y Recovery for P i .
t5.1
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T maintains a variable, recovered(m), that indicates whether the given contract has been successfully recovered or not. It also maintains a set con(m), containing the indices of the signers that contacted T for m, and a set abort_set(m) containing the indices of the signers for whom T aborted the protocol.
T ignores a recovery request from a signer if the signer has contacted T in the past. Otherwise, it checks whether the contract has already been successfully recovered or not. A successful recovery is always maintained. Otherwise, there are two cases. If the recovery request is sent in the first round, T must abort the protocol, as the request does not contain a proof that all signers actually started the protocol. If the recovery request is sent during any later round, say r, then T checks if all the requests that were aborted previously occurred at least two rounds before. If so, T can be sure that all the issued abort tokens were sent to signers who dishonestly continued the main protocol. This is because the recovery request contains r À 1 promises from all these signers, which they are not allowed to send if they contacted T in round r À 2 or before. Hence, the previous abort decision is overturned. Otherwise, T replies with an abort token.
Model
In this section, we discuss modeling of the protocols, and specification of the desired security properties. We begin by describing a game variant of Kripke structures used to model the protocols, and a branching time temporal logic used to model the desired security guarantees.
ATS, ATL AND MOCHA
The desired properties of contract signing are easily described using games, and hence we chose a game variant of Kripke structures, alternating transition systems (ATS) (Alur et al., 1997) , to model the protocols. Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) (Alur et al., 1997 ) is used to reason about alternating transition systems. We use ATL to express the protocol properties of the contract-signing protocols.
Alternating transition systems. Intuitively, an ATS is a Kripke structure with additional information about players. Y The game transition function : Q Â AE ! 2 2 Q n f;g maps a state and a player to a nonempty set of choices, where each choice is a set of possible next states. Furthermore, if AE ¼ fa 1 ; . . . ; a n g, then for every state q 2 Q and each possible Q 1 ; . . . ; Q n where Q i 2 ðq; a i Þ, Q 1 \ . . . \ Q n is a singleton. DEFINITION 2. For two states q and q 0 and a player a, we say that q 0 is an a-successor of q if there exists a set Q 0 2 ðq; aÞ such that q 0 2 Q 0 .
We denote by succðq; aÞ the set of a-successors of q.
DEFINITION 3. For two states q and q 0 , we say that q 0 is a successor of q if for all players a 2 AE, we have q 0 2 succðq; aÞ.
Thus, q 0 is a successor of q if and only if whenever the system S is in state q, the players in AE can cooperate so that q 0 will be the next state.
DEFINITION 4. A computation of S is an infinite sequence ! ¼ q 0 q 1 q 2 . . . of states such that for all positions i ! 0, the state q iþ1 is a successor of the state q i .
We refer to a computation starting at state q as a q computation. For a computation ! and a position i ! 0, we use !½i, !½0; i, and !½i; 1 to denote the i-th state in !, the finite prefix q 0 q 1 . . . q i of !, and the infinite suffix q i q iþ1 . . . of !, respectively.
Alternating-time temporal logic. The alternating-time temporal logic (Alur et al., 1997) (ATL for short) is defined with respect to a finite set Å of propositions and a finite set AE of players.
DEFINITION 5. Given a finite set Å of propositions and a finite set AE of players, an ATL formula is one of the following:
where ', ' 1 , and ' 2 are ATL formulas. Y hhAii ) ', hhAiiÌ', or hhAii' 1 U' 2 , where A AE is a set of players, and ', ' 1 , and ' 2 are ATL formulas.
The operator hh ii is a path quantifier, and ) (Bnext^), Ì (Balways^), and U (Buntil^) are temporal operators. ATL formulas are interpreted over the states of a given ATS, say S, that has the same propositions and players. The labeling of the states of S with propositions is used to evaluate the atomic formulas of ATL. The logical connectives : and _ have the standard interpretation. To gain an idea of how to evaluate a formula of the form hhAii at a state q of S, consider the following two-player game between a protagonist and an antagonist starting in q. The game proceeds in an infinite sequence of steps, and after each step, the position of the game is a state of S. Consider the game in some position u. In order to determine the next state, first the protagonist chooses for every player a 2 A, a set Q a 2 ðu; aÞ. Then, the antagonist chooses a successor (with respect to Definition 3) v of u such that v 2 \ a2A Q a , and the position of the game is updated to v. The protagonist wins the game if the resulting computation satisfies the subformula , read as a linear temporal formula whose outermost operator is ), Ì, or U. The ATL formula hhAii holds at the state q if the protagonist has a winning strategy in this game. For those familiar with branching time temporal logics, the parameterized path quantifier hhAii can be seen as a generalization of the path quantifiers of the computation tree logic (CTL): the existential path quantifier 9 corresponds to hhAEii and the universal path quantifier 8 corresponds to hh;ii.
In order to give a formal definition of the semantics of ATL, we first define the notion of strategies. Please note that in the definition, given a set Q of states, Q* is the set of all finite (possibly empty) sequence of states in Q. Q þ is the set of all nonempty finite sequence of states. DEFINITION 6. Consider an ATS S ¼ hÅ; AE; Q; Q 0 ; %; i. A strategy for a player a 2 AE is a mapping f a : Q þ ! 2 Q such that for all ! 2 Q* and all q 2 Q, we have f a ð! Á qÞ 2 ðq; aÞ.
For a set of players A AE, a strategy function F A ¼ ff a ja 2 Ag is a set of strategies, one for each player in A.
Thus, the strategy f a maps each finite prefix ! Á q of a computation to a set in ðq; aÞ and induces a set of computations that player a can enforce. The strategy function F A induces a set of computations that the set of players A can collaboratively enforce. Given a state q, and a strategy function F A , we define the outcomes of F A from q to be the set outðq; F A Þ of all q-computations that the players in A can enforce by following their strategies in F A . More precisely, we say that a computation ! ¼ q 0 ; q 1 ; q 2 ; . . . is in outðq; F A Þ if q 0 ¼ q, and for all positions i ! 0, the state q iþ1 is a successor of q i satisfying q iþ1 2 T f a 2F A f a ð!½0; iÞ. We are now ready to define the semantics of ATL. We write S; q ' (Bstate q satisfies formula ' in the structure S^) to indicate that the formula ' holds at state q of S. DEFINITION 7. Given an ATS, S ¼ hÅ; AE; Q; Q 0 ; %; i, and ATL formulas ', ' 1 and ' 2 over propositions in Å and players in AE. The relation for all q 2 Q is defined inductively as follows:
Y For p 2 Å, we have S; q p iff p 2 %ðqÞ. Y S; q :' iff S; q 6 '.
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Y S; q ' 1 _ ' 2 iff S; q ' 1 or S; q ' 2 . Y S; q hhAii)' iff there exists a strategy function F A such that for all computations ! 2 outðq; F A Þ, we have S; !½1 '. Y S; q hhAiiÌ' iff there exists a strategy function F A such that for all computations ! 2 outðq; F A Þ and all positions i ! 0, we have S; !½i '. Y S; q hhAii' 1 U' 2 iff there exists a strategy function F A such that for all computations ! 2 outðq; F A Þ there exists a position i ! 0 (depending on !) such that S; !½i ' 2 and for all positions 0 j < i, we have S; !½ j ' 1 .
When S is clear from the context, we omit it and write q '. Sometimes we write hha 1 ; . . . ; a n ii instead of hhfa 1 ; . . . ; a n gii. Additional Boolean connectives, ; !; $ are defined from : and _ in the usual manner. As in CTL, we write hhAii}' for hhAiitrue U '.
Please note that in the special case of 8Ì' hh;iiÌ', the definition of tells us that S; q 8Ì' if and only if for all q-computations !, and for all positions i ! 0, we have S; !½i '. Similarly, S; q 9}' if and only if there is some q computation ! and some position i ! 0, such that S; !½i '. As in CTL, we have the duality between 8Ì and 9}: S; q :8Ì' if and only if S; q 9}:'. Note, however, that in ATL S; q hhAiiÌ' ) S; q :hhAE n Aii}:' and S; q hhAii}' ) S; q :hhAE n AiiÌ:' while the converse statements are not true in general.
We now illustrate the expressive power of ATL. Consider the set of players AE ¼ fa; b; cg and the following formulas with their verbal (and intuitive) reading:
Y hhaii}p, player a has a strategy against players b and c to eventually reach a state where the proposition p is true; Y :hhb; ciiÌp, the coalition of players b and c does not have a strategy against a such that the proposition p remains true forever; Y hha; bii ) ðp^:hhciiÌpÞ, a and b can cooperate so that the next state satisfies p and from there c does not have a strategy to impose p forever.
Those three formulas are a good illustration of the great expressive power of ATL to express cooperative as well as adversarial behaviors between players.
We now introduce a proposition stating several facts about ATL. These facts are merely of technical interest and are introduced because they will be used in some proofs in Section 3.3. While stating the proposition, we shall use an abbreviation familiar from logic. In order to say that P is true whenever P 1 ; . . . ; P n is true, we shall write P 1 P 2 . . . P n P PROPOSITION 1. For any ATS S and any state q of S we have the following.
Proof. We shall use the definition of to prove the above.
1. We have that S; q 8Ì' 1^8 Ì' 2 , i.e., S; q 8Ì' 1 and S; q 8Ì' 2 . Let ! be an arbitrary q computation of S, and i ! 0 be an arbitrary position. Since S; q 8Ì' 1 , we have S; !½i ' 1 . Similarly, we also have S; !½i ' 2 . Hence, we get S; !½i ' 1^'2 . Since ! is an arbitrary q-computation, and i an arbitrary position, we get S; q 8Ìð' 1^'2 Þ. 2. We have that S; q hhAiiÌ' 1 _ hhAiiÌ' 2 , i.e., S; q hhAiiÌ' 1 or S; q hhAiiÌ' 2 . Suppose S; q hhAiiÌ' 1 . Then there exists a strategy function F A such that for all computation ! 2 outðq; F A Þ, and for every position i ! 0, S; !½i ' 1 , and hence S; !½i ' 1 _ ' 2 . Therefore, we obtain S; q hhAiiÌð' 1 _ ' 2 Þ in this case. Similarly, if S; q hhAiiÌ' 2 , we shall obtain S; q hhAiiÌð' 1 _ ' 2 Þ. 3. We have that
by rule ð1Þ ) S; q 8Ìððð0^' 1 Þ _ ð0^' 2 ÞÞ ! ð8Ì 1 _ 8Ì 2 ÞÞ by the Boolean law ðp ! qÞ^ðr ! sÞ ) ðp _ rÞ ! ðq _ sÞ S; q 8Ìðð0^ð' 1 _ ' 2 ÞÞ ! ð8Ì 1 _ 8Ì 2 ÞÞ by the Boolean lawðp^qÞ _ ðp^rÞ p^ðq _ rÞ ) S; q 8Ìðð0^ð' 1 _ ' 2 ÞÞ ! 8Ìð 1 _ 2 ÞÞ by rule ð2Þ 4. We have that S; q 8Ìð' 1 ! ' 2 Þ. Hence for every q-computation ! of S, for every position i ! 0, S; !½i ' 1 ! ' 2 . Moreover, we also have S; q hhAii } ð' 1^'3 Þ. Therefore, there is a strategy function F A such that for all computations ! A 2 outðq; F A Þ, there exists a position j ! 0 (depending on ! A ) with S; ! A ½j ' 1^'3 . Now pick ! 0 2 outðq; F A Þ, and fix it. There is some k ! 0 such that S; ! 0 ½k ' 1^'3 . That is S; ! 0 ½k ' 1 and S; ! 0 ½k ' 3 . We also have that S; ! 0 ½k ' 1 ! ' 2 . Hence, we get that S; ! 0 ½k ' 2^'3 . Since ! 0 is an arbitrary computation in outðq; F A Þ, we can conclude that S; q hhAii} ð' 2^'3 Þ. 5. We have that
by the Boolean law ðp ! qÞ^ðr ! sÞ ) ðp^rÞ ! ðq^sÞ ) S; q 8Ìðð' 1^'2 Þ ! 8Ìð 1^ 2 ÞÞ by rule ð1Þ
6. In order to show that S; q 8Ìð' 1 ! hhAii}' 3 Þ, we need to show that for all q-computations ! and positions i ! 0, if S; !½i ' 1 , then S; !½i hhAii}' 3 . Pick an arbitrary q-computation ! and fix it. Also pick an arbitrary position i and fix it. Assume that S; !½i ' 1 . We need to show that S; !½i 8ÌhhAii}' 3 . By assumption we have that S; q 8Ìð' 1 ! 8Ì' 1 Þ. Since S; !½i ' 1 , we get S; !½i 8Ì' 1 . By assumption, we also have S; q 8ÌhhAii}' 2 . Hence, there exists a strategy function F A , such that for every computation ! A 2 outð!½i; F A Þ, there exists a position k ! 0 (depending on ! A ) such that S; ! A ½k ' 2 . Pick an arbitrary ! 0 2 outð!½i; F A Þ, and fix it. Let l be the position such that S; ! 0 ½l ' 2 . Note that ! 0 is a computation beginning with !½i. By the above paragraph, we have S; !½i 8Ì' 1 . Therefore, we also obtain that S; ! 0 ½l ' 1 . Note that ! 0 ½0 ¼ !½i. Consider the q-computation ! 1 constructed by appending the computation ! 0 to !½0::i. In other words, let
! 1 is a q-computation. We have by assumption S; q 8Ìð' 1 ! ð' 2 ! ' 3 ÞÞ. Hence for each position j ! 0, S;
. By the above two paragraphs S; ! 0 ½l ' 1 and S; ! 0 ½l ' 2 . Therefore, we get S; ! 0 ½l ' 3 .
Therefore, given any computation ! A 2 outð!½i; F A Þ, there is a position k such that S; ! A ½k ' 3 . Hence, we obtain S; !½i hhAii}' 3 as required. Ì Game guarded command language. Instead of modeling protocols directly with ATS we use a more user-oriented notation: a guarded command language à la Dijkstra. The details about the syntax and semantics of this language (given in terms of ATS) can be found in Henzinger et al. (2000) . Intuitively, each player a 2 AE disposes of a set of guarded commands of the form guard $ ! update $ . A computation step is defined as follows: each player a 2 AE chooses one of its commands whose Boolean guard evaluates to true, and the next state is obtained by taking the conjunction of the effects of each update part of the commands selected by the players. Given an ATS described in terms of guarded commands, the finite state tool MOCHA automates the model-checking of ATL formulas over the specified ATS.
MODELING PROTOCOLS
Unlike the classical security protocols aiming at secrecy and authentication, optimistic contract-signing protocols usually consist of subprotocols that can be invoked at specified moments. Running a protocol at a time not foreseen by the designer, may have unexpected side effects. This may be used by a signer to gain an advantage over other signers. We believe that such concurrency issues are a major source of problems. Therefore, and since the high number of messages would create a serious state explosion, we analyze only the structure of the protocols and concentrate only on one single protocol instance. We now discuss our model in detail. The protocol instance is modeled as an ATS, and each protocol participant is modeled as a player in the ATS by using the above introduced guarded command language. Besides the branching aspect, another notable difference with more classical secrecy and authentication protocols is that contract-signing protocols must be secure against malicious signer, rather than an external intruder. In order to model this we have two processes for each signer, one describing its honest behavior and the other the dishonest one. Communication is modeled by using shared variables. Each protocol message is modeled by using a Boolean variable, initialized to false and set to true when it is sent. Sending of a message is modeled by using guarded commands, where the guard depends on previously sent out messages. When modeling the honest behavior of a participant, we ensure that a given message is sent out only when specified by the protocol. On the contrary, the guards are relaxed in the malicious version of the signer so that each message can be sent out, as soon as possible, that is, as soon as all messages needed to compose the given message are received. We do not explicitly model any cryptographic primitives, but only the fact that protocol messages can be sent FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING out of order. Hence, a dishonest signer can send messages out of order and continue the protocol, even if it is supposed to stop. We manually decide which messages must be known in order to send some other message. Moreover, the communication between any two signers is assumed to be on private channels, and we do not model the possibility to spy other channels. The trusted party is modeled to be always honest. For each pair of signers P i and P j , we use a proposition P i :S P j ðmÞ to model that the signer P i has obtained P j 's signature. Once P i :S P j ðmÞ is set to true, it never changes its value; that is, we assume that P i continues to hold P j 's signature once P i obtains it. For each signer P i , we also use a special proposition Pi_stop to model that the entity P i has quit the protocol. Once Pi_stop has been set to true, P i would not be able to change any of its variables as :Pi_stop is present in each of its guards.
As an example, consider the short extract of the modeling of the three-party GM protocol depicted in Figure 1 . In the extract, the integer variable Pr_i_j_L models the promises that P i has sent to P j , and Pr_i_j_L = k means that P i has sent out up to k-level promises to P j . (For efficiency reasons, we use the logarithmic encoding of a ranged integer variable, rather than having one Boolean variable for each level of promise). In the extract, the first rule of honest P 1 says that P 1 may quit the protocol if it has not contacted the trusted party and has neither received nor sent any promises. The corresponding modeling of dishonest behavior of P 1 states that P 1 may quit the protocol at any moment. The second rule of honest P 1 gives the exact condition when the first-level promise has to be sent to P 2 . The corresponding dishonest rule merely requires that P 1 has not quit the protocol before sending the promise.
As we are unable to verify parametric systems with MOCHA, we simplify our task and verify the protocols only for a given number n of signers. In order to avoid encoding each instance of the protocol using guarded commands, we have written a dedicated Cþþ program for each protocol, which takes the number n of signers as a parameter and generates the protocol specification. Although our model is restricted with regard to several aspects, the model seems to be of interest as several unknown anomalies have been revealed. Figure 1 . Extract of the three-party GM protocol modeling.
MODELING PROPERTIES
The desired security guarantees are expressed by using ATL. In this section we discuss the modeling of fairness and timeliness. The modeling for abusefreeness will be discussed when we present the analysis of GM in Section 4. Consider an instance of the protocol with n signers, which we denote as P 1 ; . . . ; P n . In the following, we assume that only one of the signers, say P 1 is honest, and the other dishonest signers are colluding to cheat the honest signer.
A protocol is fair for an honest P i , if at the end of the protocol, either P i receives signed contracts from all the other signers or it is not possible for any other signer to obtain P i 's signed contract. One possible ATL formula, henceforth referred to as STRATFAIR i , for modeling this says that if any signer receives P i 's signed contract, then P i has a strategy to get the signed contracts from other signers:
where P i :S P j ðmÞ denotes that player P i received P j 's signature on the contract text m. It can of course be argued that P i having a strategy to receive the signed contracts is not a sound modeling of fairness: P i may have this strategy but if it is ignorant or if it mistakenly does not follow this strategy, then the protocol may end in an unfair state. Therefore one could require the following stronger property (henceforth referred to as STRONGFAIR i ): in whatever way P i resolves the remaining choices specified by the protocol, P i receives all the signed contract.
In the same vein, a third weaker formulation (henceforth referred to as WEAKFAIR i ) only requires that there exists a path where P i receives the signed contracts.
We have that
In Chadha et al. (2004), we concentrated on the last, weakest version of fairness.
As we demonstrated that fairness is violated even in this weakest version, the other stronger versions are also violated.
FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING
One disadvantage with the above formulations of fairness is that MOCHA does not provide counterexamples for arbitrary ATL formulas.
j If a violation of fairness is found, we can use weaker formulas to discover scenarios leading up to the violation. An error trace usually speeds the analysis considerably. Since MOCHA does provide error traces for invariant violations, it is interesting to consider yet another formulation of the fairness property as an invariant. In Shmatikov and Mitchell (2002) , invariants have already been used to approximate fairness. The idea is to consider only the states where an honest signer has stopped the protocol. We know that once it has stopped the protocol, it cannot receive any new messages. Hence, in any state where P i has stopped the protocol (modeled by setting a special proposition P i :stop to true), fairness would require P i to have the complete contract if some P j ; j 6 ¼ i, has P i 's contract.
The invariant formulation of fairness for P i tests only those states in which P i has stopped the protocol, and is as follows.
We denote this formulation of fairness as INVFAIR i . Indeed, this formulation of fairness is weaker than the above formulations. In particular, we show that the formula WEAKFAIR i implies INVFAIR i . Before proceeding to the proof, please note that W 1 j6 ¼i n P j :S P i ðmÞ denotes that at least one signer P j ; j 6 ¼ i, has obtained P i 's contract. The formula V 1 j6 ¼i n P i :S P j ðmÞ denotes that P i has obtained contracts of all the other signers. Keeping this in mind, we use the following abbreviations for the rest of the section:
In the proof, we shall also use the additional assumption (see Section 3.2) that once P i stops the protocol, he cannot change his variables anymore. In particular, if S is the ATS that models the protocol for signers P 1 ; . . . ; P n and q 0 is any arbitrary initial state of S, we shall assume that for each 1 i; j n; i 6 ¼ j: S; q 0 8ÌððP i :stop^:P i :S P j ðmÞÞ ! 8Ì:P i :S P j ðmÞÞ ð5Þ j MOCHA does not give counterexamples because in general, counterexamples cannot always be expressed as traces, even for CTL.
This assumption can also be easily verified by MOCHA, as a sanity check of the specification. Using the above assumption and Proposition 1, we get the following proposition. PROPOSITION 2. If S is the ATS that models a contract signing protocol for signers P 1 ; . . . ; P n and q 0 is an arbitrary initial state of S, then for each 1 i n we have S; q 0 8ÌððP i :stop^:sig obtained i Þ ! 8Ì:sig obtained i Þ ð 6Þ
Proof. For each 1 j n; i 6 ¼ j, we have by Assumption (5) given above that S; q 0 8ÌððP i :stop^:P i :S P j ðmÞÞ ! 8Ì:P i :S P j ðmÞÞ Hence, by applying rule (3) of Proposition 1 n À 2 times, we get
The result is now obtained by realizing that W 1 j6 ¼i n :P i :S P j ðmÞ : V 1 j6 ¼i n :P i :S P j ðmÞ :sig obtained i . Ì
We are ready to prove that fairness in terms of the invariants is weaker than other formulations. THEOREM 1. Let S be an ATS that models a contract-signing protocol for signers P 1 ; . . . ; P n , and let q 0 be an arbitrary initial state of S. The first equivalence above follows from duality of 8Ì and 9}. The second equivalence is a consequence of the Boolean law :q^p :ðp ! qÞ. The third equivalence is again a consequence of the duality of 8Ì and 9}, and the last equivalence is the definition of the formula WEAKFAIR i . Therefore, we have S; q 0 :WEAKFAIR i as required. Ì We can also show by example that the fairness in terms of invariant is strictly weaker than any of the above formulations. Consider the following naive twoparty protocol where P 1 and P 2 directly exchange their signatures on the contractual text.
1: P 1 ! P 2 : S P 1 ðmÞ 2: P 2 ! P 1 : S P 2 ðmÞ Assuming that the protocol specifies that P 1 can stop only after it receives P 2 's signature on the contract, the protocol would not violate the invariant INVFAIR i . This is simply because P 1 will not stop until it has received P 2 's contract. On the other hand, the protocol would violate all the other formulations of fairness. In order to see this, consider the scenario in which a dishonest P 2 quits the protocol after receiving P 1 's contract and without sending P 2 's contract. So P 1 will be stuck forever waiting for P 2 's contract and would have no further possible moves. It can be easily seen that this scenario violates WEAKFAIR i : P 2 has P 1 's signature, but P 1 cannot get P 2 's signature.
Contract-signing protocols are often designed to prevent situations in which signers are waiting indefinitely. Informally, a protocol is said to be timely if it is always possible for each signer to have some recourse to prevent unbounded waiting. One possible formulation of timeliness, henceforth referred to as WEAKTIMELY i , is that a protocol is timely for a signer P i if for each reachable state there is a path in which P i has terminated:
The naive protocol above does not respect this property for P 1 . As explained before, a dishonest P 2 could stop after having received the P 1 's contract. In all paths from this state, P 1 will be stuck and cannot stop.
A stronger formulation of timeliness could require that in every possible state, P i should have a strategy to get to a state in which it has stopped executing the protocol:
Theorem 1 showed that the formulation of fairness in terms of invariant is weaker than any of the other formulations of fairness. In presence of timeliness, however, we can show that the formulation of fairness in terms of invariants coincides with other formulations of fairness. In particular, we shall show in Theorem 2 that if a protocol satisfies WEAKTIMELY i then it satisfies the formula WEAKFAIR i if and only if it satisfies INVFAIR i . In Theorem 3, we will show that if a protocol satisfies STRATTIMELY i then it satisfies STRATFAIR i if and only if it satisfies INVFAIR i .
In the proofs, we shall also use the additional assumption (see Section 3.2) that once P i obtains signature of P j , then it continues to hold that signature. If S is the ATS that models the protocol for signers P 1 ; . . . ; P n and q 0 is any arbitrary initial state of S, we shall assume that for each 1 i; j n; i 6 ¼ j: S; q 0 8ÌðP i :S P j ðmÞ ! 8ÌP i :S P j ðmÞÞ ð7Þ
Once again, this assumption can also be easily verified by MOCHA, as a sanity check of the specification. Using the above assumption and Proposition 1, we get the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. If S is the ATS that models a contract signing protocol for signers P 1 ; . . . ; P n and q 0 is an arbitrary initial state of S, then for each 1 i n we have S; q 0 8Ìðsig released i ! 8Ìsig released i Þ ð 8Þ
Proof. For each 1 j n; i 6 ¼ j, we have by the assumption above:
S; q 0 8ÌðP j :S P i ðmÞ ! 8ÌP j :S P i ðmÞÞ Hence, by applying rule (5) of Proposition 1 n À 2 times, we get S; q 0 8Ì ^1 j6 ¼i n P j :S P i ðmÞ ! 8Ì^1 j6 ¼i n P j :S P i ðmÞ
Since sig released i V 1 j6 ¼i n P j :P i ðmÞ, we obtain the desired result. Ì THEOREM 2. Let S be an ATS that models a contract-signing protocol for signers P 1 ; . . . ; P n and q 0 be an arbitrary initial state of S. We have also proved above in Proposition 3 that S; q 0 8Ìðsig released i ! 8Ìsig released i Þ:
Hence, we obtain as a result of rule (6) We have also proved above in Proposition 3 that S; q 0 8Ìðsig released i ! 8Ìsig released i Þ:
Hence, we obtain as a result of rule (6) of Proposition 1 that if S; q 0 ðSTRATTIMELY i^I NVFAIR i Þ, then
Hence we have the desired result. Ì Note that the formula STRATTIMELY i is a stronger condition than WEAKTIMELY i ; that is, if a protocol satisfies STRATTIMELY i then it will also satisfy WEAKTIMELY i . Using Theorems 2 and 3, we therefore obtain that if a protocol satisfies timeliness in terms of strategy, then the three forms of fairness STRATFAIR i , WEAKFAIR i and INVFAIR i are all equivalent. In our analysis, both the protocols that we analyzed did indeed satisfy STRATTIMELY i . We then proceeded to check if the protocols satisfied INVFAIR i . As we just noted above, this is equivalent to checking if the protocols satisfied STRATFAIR i and WEAKFAIR i .
Please note that just as we had another version of fairness, that is, STRONGFAIR i , we could posit a stronger version of timeliness: in whatever state, every execution finally leads to a state of the protocol, where an honest signer P i has quit the protocol. Just as in Theorems 2 and 3, we could then show that if a protocol satisfies this strong version of timeliness, then a protocol satisfies STRONGFAIR i if and only if it satisfies INVFAIR i . In our model, however, an honest signer does not satisfy this strong version of timeliness. This is because in our model we allow an honest signer to idle in every possible state. For the same reason, STRONGFAIR i does not hold in our model. We shall not consider these versions of fairness and timeliness in our analysis. We are now ready to present the results of analysis.
Analysis
We now discuss the results of our analysis of the two protocols. Our analysis did not reveal any anomalies in the BW protocol, and hence we shall discuss this protocol briefly.
ANALYSIS OF THE BW PROTOCOL
We have verified the BW protocol with two and up to five signers for timeliness and fairness. The model checker MOCHA did not detect any flaw in these cases. The protocol is not intended to be abuse-free, and hence we did not study the protocol for this property. In our opinion, we found that the design of the BW protocol is much simpler than the GM protocol. The decision to overturn an abort is based on the following argument: T overturns only if it can infer that no previous abort reply has been sent to a potentially honest principal. This seems to ensure the robustness of the protocol. Note that we analyzed only the structure of the protocol. Hence, our results only prove that the protocol is correct in the given model.
ANALYSIS OF THE GM PROTOCOL
We now report in more detail on our analysis of the GM contract-signing protocol. The protocol has several peculiarities. The most notable one is that the protocol changes with the number of signers, e.g., the protocol specification of P 1 differs when the value of n changes. The number of protocol messages increases considerably with the number of signers. For instance, if we have n ¼ 3, the main protocol has 20 messages, and there are 14 different recovery requests. When n ¼ 4, the corresponding numbers are 41 and 36. Moreover, the protocol is not symmetric for the signers: the protocol specification for P i is different from that for P j , for all i 6 ¼ j. For instance, when n ¼ 4, P 1 can launch 18 different recovery requests and P 4 only 2.
As mentioned in Section 3, we have written a dedicated Cþþ program that takes the number of signers, n, as a parameter and generates the protocol specification. Our analysis revealed problems with fairness, when n is 4. Although, we did not discover any fairness problems when n ¼ 3, we did find an amusing problem with abuse-freeness. We did not discover any problems with timeliness in the protocol. All these anomalies are novel and the protocol was believed to be secure since it was first published. We discuss our results in detail. The source codes of our analysis of both protocols are also available at the following website http://www.lsv.ens-cachan.fr/~kremer/MPCS/.
Fairness. We analyzed the GM protocol for three and four signers, for both fairness and timeliness. Our analysis did not reveal any flaws in timeliness. As discussed in Section 3, in presence of timeliness fairness can be expressed as an invariant. The advantage of invariant checking is that MOCHA outputs an errortrace whenever an invariant is violated. Moreover, invariant checking is more efficient.
We did not discover any problems with fairness when n ¼ 3. The formulas representing fairness for P 1 , P 2 and P 3 , introduced in Section 3, are validated by MOCHA. However, as we use a restricted model and consider single runs, we can conclude only that the protocol does not present any structural weakness for n ¼ 3. Indeed, if we relax the assumption of the private channels, the anomaly presented by Shmatikov and Mitchell (2002) on the two-party GJM protocol can be adapted to the multiparty version. In this scenario, a malicious signer eavesdrops on the channel between the honest signer and T, and succeeds in compromising fairness. With our present modeling, we do not find such flaws, as this requires us to eavesdrop channels and to decompose messages. The fix proposed by Shmatikov and Mitchell applies to the multiparty protocol too. However, we emphasize that the authors of the GM protocol require the channels to T to be private and hence this scenario does not represent a valid attack on the protocol.
We discovered several scenarios that compromised fairness when n ¼ 4. The first scenario was discovered by hand, when we found an error in the proof of correctness given in the original paper . A detailed analysis using MOCHA detected seven other scenarios. An analysis of these revealed that the proof also did not cover a case. In each scenario, an honest signer is cheated by the coalition of three malicious signers. These scenarios follow the general outline:
1. A dishonest signer contacts the trusted party, T, at the beginning of the protocol, gets an abort token, and dishonestly continues participating in the main protocol. 2. A second dishonest signer tries to recover at some later point. It does not succeed but manages to put the honest signer in the list F m . It dishonestly continues the main protocol. 3. The honest signer is forced to recover but is not successful in getting the abort decision overturned since it is in the list F m . 4. The third dishonest signer contacts T and manages to overturn the decision.
Hence, while the honest signer does not get any signed contract, the honest signer's contract is obtained.
We describe only one of these scenarios in detail. The other attack scenarios can be found in Appendix A. In this scenario, P 1 , P 3 and P 4 collude to cheat P 2 . The scenario proceeds as follows:
Y At the beginning of the protocol, P 3 aborts the protocol and T updates S m ¼ f3g. However, unlike specified by the protocol, dishonest P 3 continues the main protocol execution.
Y As soon as P 1 receives the second level promise from P 2 , it asks T to recover by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 2Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ðm; 1ÞÞÞ: FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING T refuses this request, answers with an abort message, and updates S m ¼ f1; 3g and F m ¼ f2g. As P 3 did before, P 1 also continues the protocol.
Y The main protocol is executed normally until signer P 2 reaches point 6.2 (see Table I ) of the protocol with a ¼ 4. At that point, P 2 has sent out the set of message fPCS P 2 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 2Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 2Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ðm; 3Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞg and has received the set of messages fPCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 1 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 1 ððm; 2Þ; P 2 TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 2 TÞ; PCS P 1 ððm; 3Þ; P 2 TÞg: P 2 is at position 6.2. with a ¼ 4 and is waiting for 4-level promises from P 3 and P 4 . P 3 and P 4 do not reply and P 2 is forced to send the following recovery request to T.
S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 3Þ; P 2 TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; Tg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ P 2 is in F m , the tests in the protocol description (see Table III ) indicate that T refuses the request, updates S m ¼ f1; 2; 3g and replies with an abort message. F m remains unchanged.
Y P 4 launches a resolve request, sending S P 4 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; T; PCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞg; S P 4 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ:
This request overturns the previous aborts, and hence violates fairness as T sends the signed contract back to P 4 . Such attacks are detected by MOCHA when checking the invariant representing fairness. A Bcleaned up^j version of a sample error trace illustrating an attack compromising fairness for P 3 is shown in Figure 2 .
We also discovered that the protocol is unfair for signers P 1 , P 2 and P 3 when n ¼ 4. We give the other attacks in Appendix A. We did not find any scenario j An error-trace shows a sequence of states, each described by the valuation of the variables; we used a script that transforms the output into a more readable form, showing only the variables that have changed with respect to the previous state. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING that compromised fairness for P 4 . This is probably because the tests indicate that P 4 can never be added to F m when n ¼ 4.
Threshold Security. Our analysis revealed that the protocol is flawed for n ¼ 4 signers when we have n À 1 ¼ 3 dishonest parties. An interesting line of investigation is the threshold of the protocol security, that is, how many dishonest signers are required to break fairness. While allowing only one malicious signer, MOCHA did not detect any anomaly when n is 4. However, MOCHA showed a peculiar scenario when we considered two dishonest signers when n ¼ 4. In fact, the dishonest signers may bring the protocol to a state where one of the honest signer is fooled, while the other honest signer obtains all other signatures. The amusing part of this scenario is that the dishonest signers themselves do not obtain all signatures; that is, they can decide to give an advantage to one of the participants only while fooling the other one. This protocol execution should be considered as unfair even if the dishonest signers do not obtain a direct advantage. They choose to give an advantage to one of the two honest participants. We believe that this gives an interesting insight into fairness, which cannot be observed in a two-party protocol. We describe one of these attacks in Appendix B.
Correcting the GarayYMacKenzie Protocol. In order to restore fairness in the GarayYMacKenzie protocol, we had to do major revisions in the recovery protocol. We were unsuccessful in restoring fairness with minor changes, and we believe that this is because the meaning of the list FðmÞ is not clear in the protocol. The central idea behind the revision is that T, when presented with a recovery request, overturns its abort decision if and only if T can infer dishonesty on the part of each of the signer that contacted T in the past. This is also the main idea behind the recovery protocol in Baum-Waidner and Waidner (2000) .
The main protocol remains the same. Major changes are in the recovery protocol. The recovery messages are designed so that T can infer the promises that an honest signer would have sent when it launched the recovery protocol (note that a signer may have dishonestly sent other promises). For P i to recover, it sends the message S P i fPCS P j ððm; k j Þ; P i ; TÞg j2f1;...;ngnfig ; S P i ððm; 1ÞÞÞ where k j is computed as following:
1. If P i runs the resolve protocol in step 5 of the main protocol (see Table I) , then k j ¼ 1 for j > i and k j ¼ i À 1 for j. 2. In step 6.2 of the main protocol, k j ¼ a À 1 for 1 < j a À 1; j 6 ¼ i and k j ¼ 1 for j > a À 1.
3. In step 6.4 of the main protocol, k j ¼ a À 1 for j < i, k j ¼ a for i < j a and k j ¼ 1 for j > a. 4. In step 7 of the main protocol, k j ¼ n for all j. 5. In step 9 of the main protocol, k j ¼ n for all j < i and k j ¼ n þ 1 for all j > i. k j may alternately be computed as follows: Y If j < i, k j is the maximum level of promises received from all signers P j 0 , with j 0 < i, i.e., the minYmax of the promises from signers with lower index. (For example, if the maximum level of the promises received by P 4 from P 3 and P 2 was 6, and the maximum level received by P 4 from P 1 was 5, then k j ¼ 5 for 1 j 3.) Y Let l be the maximum value l 0 such that P i has l 0 level promises from P j for all i j l 0 . If no such l 0 exists then let l be 0. If l ¼ 0, then let k j ¼ 1 for all j > i. If l 6 ¼ 0, then let k j ¼ l for all i j l and k j ¼ 1 for all j > l. (For example, if P 2 has received level 1 promise from P 6 , level 5 and 1 promises from P 5 , level 5, 4 and 1 promises from P 4 , and level 4, 3 and 1 promises from P 3 then k 6 ¼ 1;
T maintains the set SðmÞ of indices of signers that contacted T in the past and received an abort token. For each signer P i in the set SðmÞ, T also maintains two integer variables h i ðmÞ and l i ðmÞ. Intuitively, h i is the highest level promise an honest P i could have sent to any higher indexed signer before it contacted T. l i is the highest level promise an honest P i could have sent to a lower indexed signer before it contacted T. The protocol for T works as follows:
Y If T ever replies with a signed contract for m, then T responds with the contract for any further request.
Y If the first request to T is a resolve request, then T sends back a signed contract.
Y If the first request is an abort request, then T aborts the contract. T may overturn this decision in the future if it can deduce that all the signers in SðmÞ have behaved dishonestly. T deduces that a signer P i in SðmÞ is dishonest when contacted by P j if 1. j > i and P j presents to T a k-level promise from P i such that k > h i ðmÞ, or 2. j < i and P j presents to T a k-level promise from P i such that k > l i ðmÞ.
We describe the abort and recovery protocols in detail in Tables VI and VII,  respectively. We analyzed the revised protocol for both three and four signers and MOCHA did not detect any errors in the revised protocol. Please note that this should not be construed as proof of correctness since we are using a restricted communication model and are modeling a single run.
FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING
Abuse-freeness. We now describe the anomaly that we discovered for n ¼ 3 signers in the GM protocol. The anomaly exploits the fact that when T replies with an abort decision, it also signs the list SðmÞ of the signers who have received an abort from T. Recall that an optimistic signer (Chadha et al., 2003) is one that prefers to wait for Bsome time^before contacting the trusted party. Following Chadha et al. (2003) , we say that a protocol is abuse-free for a signer P i if the protocol does not provide provable advantage to the remaining signers. A coalition of signers is said to have provable advantage against P i at a point in the protocol if (i) they have a strategy to abort the contract against an optimistic P i , (ii) they have a strategy to get optimistic P i 's contract, and (iii) they can prove to an outside challenger, Charlie, that P i is participating in the protocol. Now consider the protocol instance with three signers P 1 , P 2 and P 3 . Assume that P 3 is optimistic and P 1 and P 2 are colluding to cheat P 3 . P 3 starts the protocol by sending its level 1 promises to P 1 and P 2 , and, being optimistic, waits for level 2 promises from them. P 2 on receiving this sends its level 1 promise to P 1 , and then sends an abort request to T that aborts the protocol. Now, P 1 has received level 1 promises from P 2 and P 3 . Using these first level promises, P 1 sends a recovery request to T. Note that, in the protocol, P 1 is never allowed to abort and T would not accept an abort request from P 1 . P 1 's recovery request is refused and T sends S T ðS P 2 ðm; P 2 ; ðP 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 Þ; abortÞÞ and S T ðm; SðmÞ ¼ f1; 2g; abortÞ At this point, we make the following observations:
Y the abort reply contains the set SðmÞ ¼ f1; 2g and is different from the one P 2 received, t6.1 Table VI . Revised GM multiparty contract-signing protocol Y Abort for P i . From these remarks, we can conclude that if P 1 shows the abort reply to Charlie, then Charlie will be convinced that P 3 has started the protocol even though Charlie is unable to verify the PCS from P 3 . In other words, we can say that T has verified the PCS for Charlie. Also note that at this point P 1 and P 2 can force the exchange to abort by simply quitting the protocol: P 3 has no promises from P 1 and P 2 . P 1 and P 2 can also force a successful completion of the contract exchange by simply (dishonestly) engaging P 3 in the main protocol. Hence the protocol is not abuse-free for P 3 .
This vulnerability can be easily addressed by excluding the set SðmÞ from the abort reply. In this case, the abort messages from P 3 and P 2 are exactly similar and can be obtained by P 2 without P 3 's participation. Hence, an abort reply does not prove P 3 's participation in the protocol. This rather amusing scenario illustrates that sometimes additional information may be harmful. While explicitness is often considered a good engineering practice (and we do not attempt to criticize such thumb rules), care should be taken when applying these principles. In personal communication with the authors of the protocol, they propose a different fix in letting P 1 abort the protocol rather than just quitting. If P 1 is allowed to abort the protocol, T's abort reply does not imply anymore that P 3 is participating: in contrast to the recovery request, when sending and abort request, T does not have to verify a PCS generated by P 3 .
Abuse-freeness for P 3 is naturally expressed in ATL as follows:
:9}ðT:sendðabortÞ to P 1ĥ hP 1 ; P 2 iiÌð:P 3 :S P 1 ðmÞ _ :P 3 :S P 2 ðmÞÞĥ hP 1 ; P 2 iiÌðP 3 :stop ! ðP 1 :S P 3 ðmÞ^P 2 :S P 3 ðmÞÞÞÞ
The Boolean variable T:sendðabortÞ to P 1 is set to true when P 1 receives the abort token S T ðS P 2 ðm; P 2 ; ðP 1 ; P 2 ; P 3 Þ; abortÞÞ with SðmÞ ¼ f1; 2g. As discussed before, this serves as a proof of P 3 's participation. The variables P i :S P j ðmÞ reflect that player i has received player j's signature on the contract. More precisely, the formula requires that it is not possible to reach a point where 1. P 1 and P 2 can prove to Charlie that the protocol was started by P 3 (T:
sendðabortÞ to P 1 is true), 2. P 1 and P 2 have a strategy to choose an unsuccessful outcome; that is, P 3 cannot get some signer's contract (hhP 1 ; P 2 iiÌð:P 3 :S P 1 ðmÞ _ :P 3 :S P 2 ðmÞ is true), and 3. P 1 and P 2 have a strategy to choose a successful outcome, that is, when honest P 3 stops, the dishonest players must have obtained P 3 's contract (hhP 1 ; P 2 iiÌðP 3 :stop ! ðP 1 :S P 3 ðmÞ^P 2 :S P 3 mÞ is true).
The requirement of P 3 stopping in condition 3 is to prevent it from idling forever. Even though as discussed before, the protocol is not abuse-free if P 3 is optimistic, the above formula is validated if P 3 is honest. An honest P 3 may contact T nondeterministically as permitted by the protocol. Indeed, in the scenario discussed above, an honest P 3 could prevent P 1 and P 2 from getting P 3 's signature if it contacts T. Therefore, in order to capture the scenario described above, we needed to model optimistic signers.
Following Chadha et al. (2003) , we implement an optimistic signer by adding signals that the signer uses to decide when to quit waiting for messages from other signers and contact T. P 3 uses three signals for this: one to decide when to ask T to abort and two to decide when to contact T for the two recovery protocols that P 3 can launch. These signals are controlled by a new player, P3TimeOuts, that is added to the model.
The decision to abort is modeled by two Boolean variables:
setTimeOutAbort and expiredTimeOutAbort:
While P 3 changes the value of the variable setTimeOutAbort, the variable expiredTimeOutAbort is changed by P3TimeOuts. When P 3 sends level 1 promise to P 1 and P 2 , it sets the value of setTimeOutAbort to true, and then waits for level 2 promises from them. P3TimeOuts may set expiredTimeOutAbort to true once setTimeOutAbort is set to true by P 3 . If the promises arrive before expiredTimeOutAbort is true, then P 3 continues with the main protocol, otherwise P 3 may contact T with an abort request. The decision to send recovery requests are modeled similarly. Following Chadha et al. (2003) , abuse-freeness is modeled by having a coalition of P3TimeOuts, P 1 and P 2 . This coalition can choose a sufficiently Blong time^to keep P 3 from contacting T, while allowing P 1 and P 2 to schedule its messages in order to get the desired result. Abuse-freeness can then be expressed as follows.
:9}ðT:sendðabortÞ to P 1ĥ hP 1 ; P 2 ; P3TimeOutsiiÌð:P 3 :S P 1 ðmÞ _ :P 3 :S P 2 ðmÞÞĥ hP 1 ; P 2 ; P3TimeOutsiiÌðP 3 :stop ! ðP 1 :S P 3 ðmÞ^P 2 :S P 3 ðmÞÞÞÞ Please note that even an optimistic P 3 should eventually be allowed to contact T, otherwise P 3 may be stuck forever. Hence, P3TimeOuts must eventually set expiredTimeOutAbort and other signals to true. Ideally, this should be set nondeterministically. However, ensuring that a variable changes its value in MOCHA slows verification considerably. In order to make the verification feasible, we put a maximum limit, tick, on the number of computation steps after which the value must change, and vary this limit manually. Please note that the signals may change before this limit is reached. This modeling is sound in the sense that if the formula is violated for some value of tick, then abuse-freeness must be violated: P 3 just needs to wait for sufficiently Blong time^to allow P 1 and P 2 to schedule its messages. Indeed, the above property is violated when tick is set to 3 giving us the attack on abuse-freeness. As expected, if we drop the player P3TimeOuts in the formula, then the property is not violated: P 1 and P 2 are not able to schedule their messages ahead of P 3 .
However, if P 3 is not optimistic, the above given formulation of abusefreeness is not violated. In a non-optimistic setting, the vulnerability can be detected by weakening the third requirement of the formula in order to say that there is a trace in which P 3 does not contact T, and P 1 and P 2 get P 3 's signed contract. The ATL formula that captures this is :9}ðT:sendðabortÞ to P 1ĥ hP 1 ; P 2 iiÌð:P 3 :S P 1 ðmÞ _ :P 3 :S P 2 ðmÞÞ9
ÌðP 3 :stop ! ðP 1 :S P 3 ðmÞ^P 2 :S P 3 ðmÞÞÞÞ This property is violated even in the original non-optimistic model. MOCHA also detected the violation of a stronger version of abuse-freeness proposed in Kremer and Raskin (2002) . This formulation requires that as soon as P 2 and P 3 can prove to Charlie that P 1 started the protocol, then they may not achieve an unsuccessful outcome anymore.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have studied two multiparty contract-signing protocols Baum-Waidner and Waidner, 2000) using a finite-state tool, MOCHA, that allows specification of properties in a branching-time temporal logic with game semantics. In order to make this analysis feasible, we model single runs and assume a restricted communication model. Our analysis did not find any errors in the BW protocol (Baum-Waidner and Waidner, 2000) . We did encounter problems with fairness in the case of four signers in the GM protocol ). It appears that fairness cannot be restored without completely rewriting the subprotocols. The revised subprotocols are inspired by the BW protocol. We also discovered a rather amusing problem with abuse-freeness in the GM protocol with three signers that occurs because abort messages from the trusted party reveal who have contacted it in the past. This problem is easily addressed by ensuring that the trusted party does not send this extra information. We had to implement optimistic signers to demonstrate this problem using MOCHA. Overturning of abort decisions were important features of multiparty contract-signing that were not present in two-party protocols. In particular, T's decision when to overturn was at the origin of the flaws in the GM protocol.
However, it remains to be investigated formally whether this is a necessary feature to maintain fairness, that is, whether in any contract-signing protocol for n ! 3 signers there are scenarios in which T must overturn the abort decision.
We modeled single runs and used a restricted communication and cryptographic model for our analysis. Previous work on two-party contract signing protocols has shown that they are prone to error in a more general setting. For example, in Chadha et al., (2001) and Gürgens and Rudolph (2003) , the authors exhibit problems with fairness when multiple sessions are involved, and in Backes et al. (2003) , the authors exhibit errors when black-box cryptography is replaced by provably secure cryptographic signature schemes. We plan to verify the protocols without fixing the number of signers. One major challenge in such a parametric verification is that the protocol descriptions change fundamentally with the number of signers in that the protocol for n signers is not merely putting n identical processes in parallel. We hope to prove the correctness of these protocols in a more general setting which accounts for cryptography, multiple concurrent sessions, and relaxes the communication model. We plan to use theorem provers such as Isabelle (Nipkow et al., 2002) and PVS (Crow et al., 1995) to achieve this. Proofs might also involve, at least partially, abstraction techniques such as those used by Das and Dill (2001) in their work.
Subsequent to our work, independent work by Aybek Mukhamedov and Mark D. Ryan (personal communication, Oct. 2005) has found that fairness fails even for the revised protocol for 5 signers (which does not contradict any of our results). Moreover, they have an informal argument to show that no resolve protocol can fix the problem.
3. P 1 is forced to recover by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f3; 2; 1g and F m ¼ f1g. 4. P 4 recovers by sending S P 4 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞg; S P 4 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ and succeeds in overturning the abort decision.
In a second attack against P 1 , it is P 2 who succeeds in receiving P 1 's signature. Note that the attack is rather different from the previous one, as P 3 is added to F m in this attack.
1. At the beginning P 4 aborts but continues the protocol. We have that S m ¼ f4g and F m ¼ ;. 2. As soon as possible, P 2 recovers by sending S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 3Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; TÞg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 2g and F m ¼ f3; 1g. 3. P 1 is forced to recover by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 2; 1g and F m ¼ f3; 1g. 4. P 3 recovers by sending S P 3 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 5Þ; P 3 ; TÞg; S P 3 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ and succeeds in overturning the abort decision.
There exists also a third attack against P 1 . This time, it is P 2 who succeeds in getting P 1 's signature.
1. At the beginning P 4 aborts but continues the protocol. We have that S m ¼ f4g and F m ¼ ;. 2. As soon as possible, P 3 recovers by sending S P 3 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 3Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 3Þ; P 3 ; TÞg; S P 3 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 3g and F m ¼ f2; 1g. 3. P 1 is forced to recover by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 3; 1g and F m ¼ f2; 1g. 4. P 2 recovers by sending S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 5Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 5Þ; P 2 ; TÞg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ and succeeds in overturning the abort decision.
Attacks against P 2 . In addition to the attack on P 2 which we described in details above, there exists an attack where P 3 receives P 2 's signature on the contract.
1. At the beginning P 4 aborts but continues the protocol. We have that S m ¼ f4g and F m ¼ ;. 2. As soon as possible, P 1 recovers by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 2Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 1g and F m ¼ f2g. 3. P 2 is forced to recover by sending S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 2; 1g and F m ¼ f2g.
FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING 4. P 3 recovers by sending S P 3 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞg; S P 3 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ and succeeds in overturning the abort decision.
There exists a third attack against P 2 . This attack is similar to the previous one, in the sense that it is P 3 who obtains P 2 's signature. However, the Battack technique^slightly differs, since here P 3 is in F m , while this is not the case in the previous attack.
1. At the beginning P 4 aborts, but continues the protocol. We have that S m ¼ f4g and F m ¼ ;. 2. As soon as possible, P 1 recovers by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 1g and F m ¼ f3; 2g. 3. P 2 is forced to recover by sending S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 2; 1g and F m ¼ f3; 2g. 4. P 3 recovers by sending S P 3 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 5Þ; P 3 ; TÞg; S P 3 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ and succeeds in overturning the abort decision.
Attacks against P 3 . We also discovered two attacks against P 3 . In the first attack, P 2 is able to obtain P 3 's signature on the contract test.
1. At the beginning P 4 aborts but continues the protocol. We have that S m ¼ f4g and F m ¼ ;.
2.
As soon as possible, P 1 recovers by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 2Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 1g and F m ¼ f3g. 3. P 3 is forced to recover by sending S P 3 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞg; S P 3 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 3; 1g and F m ¼ f3; 2g. 4. P 2 recovers by sending S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 2 ; TÞg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ and succeeds in overturning the abort decision.
In the second attack on P 3 , it is P 1 who succeeds in overturning the abort decision and getting P 3 's signed contract.
1. At the beginning P 4 aborts but continues the protocol. We have that S m ¼ f4g and F m ¼ ;. 2. As soon as possible, P 2 recovers by sending S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 2Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; TÞg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 2g and F m ¼ f3g. 3. P 3 is forced to recover by sending S P 3 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 3 ; TÞg; S P 3 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f4; 3; 1g and F m ¼ f3g. 4. P 1 recovers by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 4Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ FORMAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIPARTY CONTRACT SIGNING and succeeds in overturning the abort decision.
B. A PECULIAR ATTACK AGAINST THE GM PROTOCOL
We here briefly sketch one of the Bpeculiar^attacks against the GM protocol in the case we have two dishonest participants out of four. The particularity of the attack is that the dishonest participants do not gain any advantage. They bring the protocol into a state where one of the two honest parties ends up with the signatures while all the other participants are unable to get all signatures. Moreover, MOCHA does not find any attack for this threshold where one of the dishonest parties gains the advantage.
We illustrate the attack where P 1 and P 4 are honest and P 1 will be flawed.
1. At the beginning P 3 aborts but continues the protocol. We have that S m ¼ f3g and F m ¼ ;. 2. As soon as possible, dishonest P 2 recovers by sending S P 2 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 2Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 2 ; TÞg; S P 2 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f3; 2g and F m ¼ f1g. 3. Honest P 1 is forced to recover by sending S P 1 ðfPCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 1 ; TÞ; PCS P 4 ððm; 1Þ; P 1 ; TÞg; S P 1 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ but receives an abort reply from T. We have that S m ¼ f3; 2; 1g and F m ¼ f1g. 4. Honest P 4 is forced to recover by sending S P 4 ðfPCS P 1 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞ; PCS P 2 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞ; PCS P 3 ððm; 3Þ; P 4 ; TÞg; S P 4 ððm; 1ÞÞÞ and overturns the abort decision.
